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WHEN THE PENDULUM SWINGS TOO FAR:
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS IN
KENYA
Sylvia Wairimu Kang'ara*
The development pendulum is swinging once again, from overcommitment to the public sector to an over-enthusiasm for the
private sector. A "garage sale" of public enterprises is going on all
over the world - from New Delhi to Rio, from Moscow to Warsaw
- enough to warm the heart of any idealogue (sic] of capitalism.
And professional shock therapists roam the globe in search of
willing victims, delivering the message of overnight change. This
long overdue return to the market is welcome, but the pendulum
may once again swing too far.'

I. INTRODUCTION

An analysis of the relationship between provisions of international
human rights law and the processes of macro-economic reform in
Kenya, taking place since the 1980s, reveals that structural adjustment
programs as presently formulated are double-edged. On the one hand,
the freeing of the Kenyan economy from state control and the
promotion of private enterprise is important for the country's
economic development. The formulation of policies and regulations to
facilitate this process are not necessarily inconsistent with respect to
international human rights.
Additionally, through the good
governance framework, attempts have been made to interpret the
constitutional mandates of the international financial institutions, at
whose instance the reforms take place, as incorporating international
human rights. On the other hand, notwithstanding this apparent
salutation of international human rights by international financial

LL.B (Nairobi), LLM, SJ.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. This paper was first written as an
LL.M thesis in 1998 under the invaluable counsel of Professor Anne Marie Slaughter. James Gathii,
Celestine Nyamu and Joel Ngugi gave me invaluable comments at that time for which I am deeply
indebted. My academic interactions with Professors Duncan Kennedy, David Kennedy and Robert Bates
over the last year have no doubt taken my original ideas a step further and for their time and instruction I
am grateful. The American Association of University Women has provided generous financial support for
the course of my work. Any mistakes are mine alone.
'MAHBUB UL HAQ, REFLEcrIONS ON HUMAN DEvELOPMENr 140 (1995).
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institutions, the economic reform experience in Kenya so far
demonstrates deep-rooted tensions with respect to human rights.
This paper is an examination of these tensions. I have isolated
three interrelated factors to critique the relationship between structural
adjustment programs and human rights law: the changing role of the
state in the economic sphere; the increased role of international
institutions in the economic development of member states; and the
place of human rights in this process. In making this analysis, I am
confronted by challenges posed by evidence implicating the state in
economic mismanagement and the traditional impotence of the human
rights discourse in addressing economic, social and cultural rights. I
however find that the human rights violations wrought by structural
adjustment programs nonetheless provide an opportune basis to
strengthen the role of the state in economic development as well as
awaken the human rights regime to its self-made pitfalls. The
challenge is to navigate between a predatory and intrusive state that
stifles private incentives and causes inefficiency in the market place,
and a human rights discourse that watches idly as a citizenry's most
basic human rights, basic human needs such as food and shelter, are
denied in an unmitigated market economy.
In Part II, I discuss Kenya's on-going journey from a statist to a
market economy, bringing out the justifications given for structural
adjustment programs and revealing their inconsistency with
international human rights. To demonstrate this inconsistency, I focus
on the right to an adequate standard of living enumerated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 3 I argue that
development programs need to take into account human rights as an
inseparable aspect of the economic reform process.
In Part III, I examine how the law relating to international financial
institutions (mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)) allows the formulation of economic policies that
disregard international human rights. I argue that international
financial institutions have no binding obligations to incorporate human
2 G.A Res. 217(A) (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
3 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI). Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. Gaor Supp. 16, UN Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S.

3, reprinted in 6 I.LM. 360 (1967).
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rights in their economic development functions, and that in fact they
do not do so. This is despite the fact that these institutions have been
established for the realization of economic development of member
states and indeed, have incrementally continued to make policies that
have had far reaching effects on human destiny. I question the
justification made for this gap between the objectives of the
international financial institution and their persistence in disregarding
certain aspects of these objectives.
I conclude, in Part IV, with observations drawn from the
provisions and practice of South African constitutional jurisprudence
on the justiciability of economic human rights and see in roads to the
possibility of writing and reading these rights into the constitutional
reform process now being negotiated in Kenya.
II. The Double Edged Sword: Economic or Human Development?
Structural adjustment programs originate from an economic school
of thought that assumes the possibility of differentiating economic
from human development, or at least prioritizes the former over the
latter, by assigning a minimal, merely facilitative economic role to the
state. 4 This is reflected in the post-1980 economic management design
of the international financial institutions which is tri-faceted:
privatization of government-run entities based on the assumption of
the economic efficiency of free market forces in creating economic
growth; rationalization of government expenditure to reduce the
damaging effect of high budget deficits on the economy; and trade
liberalization through the restructuring of foreign trade policies based
on the assumption that the exposure of domestic industries to external
competition creates private investment incentives, and therefore
growth. 5 The failure by many developing economies to follow this
economic reform package has been given as the prime reason for their
4 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1994); W. Roepke, Economic Order
and
International Law, 86 Recueil des Cours 203 (1954).
5 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEv., ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (1981). Although these proposals have been amended, they
remain the basis for the adjustment process and have been widely criticized for failing to address the
African economic crisis realistically. For a critical analysis of this report see R. H. Green, The World
Bank's Agenda for Accelerated Development: Dialectics, Doubts and Dialogues, in AFRICA IN
ECONOMIC CRISiS, 60 (1986).
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economic degeneration characterized by balance of payments deficits
and slow economic growth.6 However economic stagnation in
developing countries during this period was not an exclusively internal
phenomenon. External factors including the general recession of the
world economy, unequal terms of international trade, the oil crises of
the 1970s, and loose lending to developing countries with the influx of
petro-dollars culminating in the debt crises7 , played a significant role.
The contribution of external factors to the economic crisis in
developing countries, reflecting the interdependence of the world
economic system, has
however been downplayed by international
8
financial institutions.
Post independence economic planning and management prioritized
industrial development and cash crop agriculture which consequently
perceived an active role for the state in the economy. 9 Upon
attainment of independence, government expenditure, which structural
adjustment programs have targeted for contraction, was highly
concentrated in human development projects and the provision of such
basic human necessities as food, education, shelter, sanitation, clean
water, housing and basic healthcare. For the newly independent state,
there was also need to concentrate resources in infrastructure such as
transportation and communication networks, energy and numerous
other forms of infrastructure necessary for commercial and industrial
growth.10 This need to lay down a firm ground for economic growth
6 p. Streeten, A Survey of the Issues and Options, in Structural ADJUSTMENT AND AGRICULTURE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA 4 (S. Commander ed., 1989). To achieve these
objectives, the IMF and World Bank have sponsored programs that exhibit the following common
features: (1) Demand restraint through reduced government expenditure, a ceiling on expansion, increased
taxation, limits on wages and public sector employment; (2) Require the switch of resources to tradables
by using policy instruments such as devaluation and price reform; (3) Follow policies aimed at improving
the medium- and long-term efficiency of the economy, measures that include financial reform and import
liberalization. See Khan & Sonko, A Multidimensional Approach to Designing Effective Adjustment
Programs, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN AFRICA: ADJUSTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 8 (G. W.
Shepherd ed., 1994), quoting F. Stewart, in THE MP AND WORLD BANK IN AFRICA: CONDITIONALITY,
IMPACT AND ALTERNATIVES 31 (Havnevik, ed., 1987).
Among the numerous materials addressing the third world debt crisis are: JOHN LOXLEY, DEBT
AND DISORDER: EXTERNAL FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT (1986); BONNIE K. CAMPBELL, POLITICAL
DIMENSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS (1989); CHERYL PAYER, LENT AND LOST: FOREIGN
CREDIT AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1991); PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING,
CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991).
' WORLD BANK, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: REFORMS, RESULTS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD (1994).
9 IAN MALCOM DAVID LITTLE ET AL., INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1970).
10See JEAN-PAUL AZAM, BYPASSING THE STATE: ECONOMIC GROWTH IN KENYA, 1964-90 (1997).
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and human development was met mainly through loans made available
by the World Bank and, in the event of temporary economic
disequilibrium, by the IMF.
In the wake of structural adjustment programs rationalization of
government expenditure was to be.achieved through the withdrawal of
government subsidies from the economy. Consequently, the costs of
these services were transferred to the users, with little or no
consideration being made to their ability to meet the increased costs.
While government intervention in human development was cut back,
international debt servicing had to be maintained - through further
reduction in the government's operating expenditure. I"
State control of trade did not begin with the independence
government as the colonial government also heavily restricted African
economic activity in a bid to secure total European control over the
economy. The independence government, elsewhere described as the
uncritical successor of the colonial government 12, inherited this
ubiquitous state control but for two different reasons: to facilitate
development and this control of monopolies. This led to the
emergence of a price control legal regime 1 to uphold strict principles
of consumer protection. 14 The government also embraced the
'Africanization' policy in trade and the public sector to affirmatively
support African entrepreneurs who had been relegated to the abyss of
economic activity during the colonial era. 15
The vision for economic development in Kenya as embraced by
soon encountered profound
the independence government
politicization. Policies geared towards protecting consumers against
" S.San,

Debt, Development and the International Monetary Fund, in THE WORLD'S MONETARY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 17 (Q. M.
Griesgraber & B. G. Gunter, eds., 1996).
12Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1113, 1116(1995).
13The Price Control Act, Chapter 402 of the Laws of Kenya, now repealed, governed this. It was in
1989 replaced by Part IV of the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act, Chapter
504 of the Laws of Kenya. The replacement, we must however note, was an almost verbatim reproduction
of the repealed Act.
14LAWRENCE D. SMITH, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND AGRICULTURAL
PRICING POLICIES IN KENYA (1969); see also CODA AND PARTNERS, THE RESTRICTIVE TRADE
SYSTEM:

TOWARD STABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

PRACTICES, MONOPOLIES AND PRICE CONTROL ACT, 1988 - A CRITIQUE 49 (1990).

1s Trade Ucensing Act, Chapter 497 of the Laws of Kenya. See also the discussion on
Africanization policy [and mark its racist approach] in DAVID HIMBARA, KENYAN CAPITALISTS, THE
STATE, AND DEVELOPMENT (1994).
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potential monopolists, regulation of the trade and industry to achieve
both development and promote African entrepreneurship, governmentdirected marketing and processing of agricultural produce, did not
achieve their stated objectives. First, they led to the creation of a
strong state which, although perceivably imperative for the
development of the newly independent nation, suppressed private
economic and political liberty and tended towards inefficiency, poor
planning and corruption.' 6 Second, the protectionist economic design
adopted had counter-productive consequences. For example, while
food subsidies were intended to ensure that the low income waged or
salaried citizen could afford basic foodstuffs, their cost was borne by
the hard-working, also low income, farmers. The result of this and
many other government interventions in the economy was reduced
food production, persistent famines and the stunted growth of private
economic activity.' 7 Opportunities to change the course of economic
governance was in no small measure lost to the machinations of cold
war era politics in which western governments made alliances with the
third world
prolonging unsustainable and oppressive economic
8
'
practices.
In light of the failure of the State-run economy to spur economic
growth, the arguments presented in favor of structural adjustment do,
on the face of it, seem to make perfect economic sense. However, the
crisis-solving ability of structural adjustment programs has not met
consensus even amongst economists themselves. Hence, beneath what
appears to be a grand plan for the rehabilitation of the Kenyan
economy are serious controversies and disagreements that depict the
entire project to be a monumental experiment.
Although the control of the economy by the government registered
a considerable degree of inefficiency, the move toward a liberal
market economy has led to immense deprivation, entrenchment of
poverty and a general decline in the living standards of the majority.
Issues of equitable distribution of wealth, gender, ethnic and racial
equality, the survival of local entrepreneurship and human resource
development arise particularly with respect to privatization and
16id.
17

ROBERT H. BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA:

THE POLITICAL BASIS OF

AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES (1984).
"8 WILLIAM SAMPSON KLOCK RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES (1998).
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liberalization. 19 Beyond issues of equality and fair opportunity in the
economy, a strong argument for a facilitative role of the State in
industrial and agricultural development must still be made2 ° , to
strengthen the quest for development as a basic human right. The
original post-independence vision of state-led growth, though
inappropriately executed, should not be lost. At the end of the day,
markets are profoundly a social phenomenon, not entirely private,
wholly dependent on social and political stability, all requiring stage
management by the state to harness investment capital and prioritize
specific forms of investments. Peter Evans observes the state in
circumstances of structural change as both the problem and solution:
The crux of the problem faced by late developers is that
institutions that allow large risks to be spread across a wide
network of capital holders do not exist, and individual capitalists
are neither able nor interested in taking them on. Under these
circumstances, the state must serve as surrogate entrepreneur ....
States that succeed in undertaking the tasks... are legitimately
called "developmental". They extract surplus but they also provide
collective goods.
They foster long-term entrepreneurial
perspectives among private elites by increasing incentives to
engage in transformative investments and lowering the risks
involved in such investments. They may not be immune to rentseeking or to using some of the social surplus for the ends of
incumbents and their friends rather than those of the citizenry as a
whole. Yet, on balance, the consequences of their actions promote
rather than impede economic adjustment and structural
adjustment. 2

'y

REPUBLIC OF KENYA, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA:

AN APPROACH TO

HUMAN-CENTERED DEVELOPMENT AND ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY 4, 5 (1994). In recognition of this,
the government addressed itself to social dimensions of development, stating:
Economic growth is however, essential but not sufficient to ensure social
development. To reduce and eliminate widespread poverty, to increase productive
employment and reduce unemployment, and to enhance social integration requires
ensuring that economic growth integrates social considerations. Macroeconomic
stability and structural reforms should, therefore, not be pursued at the cost of the
needs and interests of poor and vulnerable sections of the population. In fact such
an approach may well compromise the very possibility of stability.
20 ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE MARKET MEETS ITS MATCH: RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMIES OF
EASTERN EUROPE (1994).
21 P. Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural
Change, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE
CONFLICTS, AND THE STATE (S. Haggard, ed., 1992).
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Vulnerable groups suffering the harsh effects of structural
adjustment, including death from starvation and disease and nonattendance or discontinuation from primary education have been
identified to include: female headed households, children, rural smallscale farmers, landless rural workers, pastoralists, persons in the arid
and semi-arid areas, women, the elderly poor, the handicapped and the
unemployed. 22 These, it is useful to note, particularly the rural smallscale farmers, comprise the majority of the Kenyan population.
Whereas the developed world economies have a substantially
developed welfare system and other mechanisms to combat social side
effects of economic liberalism, this is not so in the case of third world
countries such as Kenya. The World Bank, in its 1990 World
Development Report 23, acknowledged the adverse effects structural
adjustment programs had on the poor. UNICEF too in its report,
Development with a Human Face, drew attention to the adverse effects
of structural adjustment programs on children and women and
advocated for a humane program of economic development. 24 The
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 1989 registered
forceful disagreement with the approach taken by the international
financial institutions in the formulation and implementation of these
programs in Africa. It objected to the effects of austerity measures
embodied in these programs and itemized alternative modes of
adjustment in what was termed the African Alternative Framework to
StructuralAdjustment Programmes
for Socio-Economic Recovery and
25
Transformation(AAF-SAP)
22 REPUBLIC OF KENYA,

supra note 19, at 12 para. 2.11. This work also makes an analysis of the

incidence of poverty in Kenya at par. 2.10, based on the findings of the 1992 Welfare Monitoring Survey,
as follows: (a) About 30% of Kenya households are female headed of whom 53% were poor; (b) 52% of
subsistence farmers, 50% of the landless and 43% of the pastoralists were poor; (c) 57% of household
heads who had no education lived below the absolute poverty line, and (d) the poor spent 61% of their
total expenditure
on food as compared to 46% by the non-poor.
23
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1990).
24 ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE AND PROMOTING GROWTH
(Giovanni Andrea Comia et al. eds., 1987).
25 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, UN Doc. E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.3 (1989).
J.
Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in
Africa, 26 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. I (1995), makes an analysis of the recommendations and summarizes them
thus:
Major policy directions: a) enhanced production and efficient resource use; (b)
greater and more efficient domestic resource mobilization; (c) improving human
resources capacity; (d) strengthening scientific and technological base, and (e)
vertical and horizontal diversification.
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These criticisms reflect the inconsistency of structural adjustment
programs with development and any notions of economic growth. The
human and social cost of implementing the policies casts a dark
shadow on the whole process of development, and calls for a
discussion on the larger question of human rights in the formulation of
economic policies. Arguments for the protection of economic and
social rights have often been confronted by the counter argument of
non-justiciability. However this particular understanding of human
rights remains, like that informing structural adjustment programs,
very much based on western liberal, and universalist conceptions
which have not gone uncontested.26 Moreover, if justiciability or want
of it be the issue here, though it should not be, I argue that structural
adjustment programs have even inflicted human rights violations of a
civil and political nature.
A. Economic, Social and CulturalRights
The Bill of Rights under the Constitution of Kenya 27 mainly
protects civil and political rights without significant provisions for
social, economic and cultural rights. The problem of ensuring basic
necessities, food sufficiency, adequate healthcare, sanitation and clean
water, primary education and minimum infrastructure depends solely
on the vigilance and commitment of the government. At best, social
but not legal avenues would be available to demand these rights as
against the government. 28 Save for labor and employment laws, trade
union laws and laws on housing standards, there are no specific laws
that make it the responsibility of the government to ensure rights to
basic necessities and a minimum standard of living. Consequently, the
Income allocation factors: (a) establish a pragmatic balance between the public and
private sectors; (b) create an enabling environment for sustainable development; (c)
shift resources from non-productive and military expenditure, and (d) improve the
pattern of income distribution among different categories of household.
See for example, Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Humnan Rights, 36 VA. J. INT*L L. 589 (1996).
27The Constitutional history of Kenya is given in YASH P. GHAI, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL
CHANGE INKENYA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
THE PRESENT (1970).
2 This is in comparison with, for example, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996),
which specifically confers these rights on the citizens and binds the state to make provision for them. On
the basis of these constitutional provisions, individuals have been able to bring legal proceedings in courts
of law for the realization of these rights.
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age of structural adjustment did not encounter an intact legal
framework that could be used to arrest the adverse effects of structural
adjustment. With legal avenues seemingly closed, social and political
pressure has been mounted to protest heavy taxation, inflation and
high interest rates, retrenchment of workers, and lack of basic
necessities such as health care, primary education and shortage of
basic foodstuffs.
Unlike the Kenyan Constitution, the international legal regime at
least makes allowance for social and economic rights indicating an
acceptance of the interconnectedness of human and economic
development.
Moreover, the regime of international social and
economic rights is one that continues to grow despite the failure of
international consensus on treaties pertaining to them.2 9 Kenya has
ratified most international human rights treaties.
The Kenyan judiciary has not actively applied provisions of
international law not expressly incorporated in national laws.
Moreover, even the enumerated rights under the Kenyan Bill of Rights
30
have proven extremely difficult to enforce in court against the State.
This perhaps clearly demonstrates that provisions of international
human rights law, especially those on economic and social rights,
would equally be difficult to enforce in Kenya. Nonetheless, it is
possible to deduce from the government's compliance with the
supervisory power of the United Nations organs that Kenya
acknowledges international human rights obligations and these need
not be expressly provided for in Kenyan laws to be applied by the
courts. However, to do this, the courts would need to be independent,
willing to give a broad and generous interpretation to rights and
commanding effective enforcement machinery.

29 These have been called the 'emerging human rights' which are primarily focused on social and
economic rights and the right to development. They seek to establish international responsibility upon
states to pursue or at least observe practices that are consistent with the development of the less developed
nations. See: F. V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: A NEW
DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1990); GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, EMERGING HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY CONTEXT (1990); VED P. NANDA. WORLD DEBT AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT (1993).
" G. lmanyara. The Judiciaryon Focus Once Again, 52 THE NAIROBI LAW MONTHLY 8 (1995).
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B. The Right to an Adequate Standardof Living
Before the advent of structural adjustment, poverty and the want
for basic necessities was far from being eradicated in Kenya, and
indeed in many nations of the world. In fact, one of the reasons that
led to Kenya's unfavorably high credit account balance, cited as one of
the reasons necessitating the implementation of structural adjustment
programs, was the famine of 1979-80 and the subsequent massive food
imports. 3 1 Consequently, to say that the implementation of structural
adjustment programs has resulted in the lowering of standards of living
is not to suggest that previous living standards were good. The
assertion here is that structural adjustment programs introduced radical
change in national economic policies, which though acclaimed to be
corrective of inefficiency, resulted in lowering already appalling
standards of living and further entrenching the high levels of poverty.
The question, what comprises an 'adequate standard of living',
finds an answer in the enumerations of international human rights
instruments, which make specific guarantees including the right to
food, health, social security, work, education, shelter, and clothing,
among others. 32 It is that minimum standard that is commensurate
with human dignity and well being, without which freedom, justice
and peace cannot be realized nor civil and political rights enjoyed.
The realization of economic, social and cultural rights requires an
integrated national economy and a fair international economic system.
The right to food depends to a great extent on the ability of an
economic system to sustain food production.
However, State
responsibility does not end with creating an atmosphere conducive for
production. The challenge is to sustain private production while at the
same time ensuring availability to all. Though an economy may get
the prices right, and though high production levels may be registered at
the end of each production cycle, mass deprivation and famine deaths
may persist because of the configuration of market systems and legal
regimes. Amartya Sen has stated:
31 1 WORLD BANK, KENYA: GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE (1983).
32 A discussion on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights including the
meaning of an adequate standard of living is given in MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT

(1995).
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The point is not so much that there is no law against dying of
hunger. That is, of course, true and obvious. It is more that the
legally guaranteed rights of ownership, exchange and transaction
delineate economic systems that can go hand in hand with some

people failing to acquire enough food for survival.. .And that can
result in serious deprivation - possibly even starvation death. In
seeking a remedy to this problem of terrible vulnerability, it is

natural to turn towards a reform of the legal system, so that rights
of social security can be made to stand as guarantees of minimal
33
protection and survival.

Notwithstanding the assumptive justifications for structural
adjustment programs, abrupt as opposed. to gradual withdrawal of
government subsidies from the agricultural sector was ill-timed
considering the already prevailing harsh economic conditions. Food
shortage, coupled with reduced economic ability to purchase, all of
which are substantially the result of the implementation of structural
adjustment programs, have led to extensive starvation and
4
malnutrition.
Structural adjustment programs were designed to make a complete
overhaul of ailing economies, presumably for the reason that economic
growth could only be realized if reform is integrated, as all sectors of
the economy are interdependent. A backlash in one sector undermines
progress in another. This probably is the nature of human institutions,
they are interdependent. Similarly, the unavailability of food works to
undermine health, affect productivity, and education, breeds inequality
and entrenches poverty. The logic informing extensive economic
reform under structural adjustment does not, however, seem to have
been extended to the problem of human development.
The reduction of government expenditure on health as another
strategy for economic growth under the structural adjustment programs
has left the already impoverished Kenyan health system in a
deplorable condition. With the food sector also reeling under similar
pressure, coupled with increased levels of poverty and poor sanitation,
3

AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION (1999),

as quoted in HENRY J. STEINER,

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS AND MORALS 270-71 (1996). See also
AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION (1981).
34 Republic of Kenya, supra note 19, at 53, 61 (an analysis of child malnutrition) and at 59 (an
analysis of famine cites market liberalization as one of its causes).

WHEN THE PENDULUM SWINGS TOO FAR

poor housing, pollution and lack of adequate or any medical treatment,
standards of health have acutely deteriorated. Curable sanitation
related diseases that were hitherto reasonably under control such as
typhoid fever, dysentery, cholera, tuberculosis and malaria have
increased. The situation worsens with the failure or inability of the
government to stock the requisite
drugs and the inability of the people
5
to afford medical treatment.
The retrenchment of the public sector labor force resulting in the
lay off of low-wage workers has resulted in high unemployment
levels. The assumptions underlying the public sector reform program
are that with the growth of the economy following privatization and
liberalization measures, sufficient or significant employment
opportunities will be created, absorbing the laid off workers. These
assumptions on economic growth and increased employment
opportunities have not been realized, leaving many without a source of
livelihood. Those outside the public sector have been no less affected.
The exposure of the local informal sector, otherwise known as the Jua
Kali sector36 , to external competition has led to its weakening and the
crippling of locally-owned industries. Though intended to create a
competitive commercial environment, economic liberalization assumes
that local industries are endowed with sufficient ability to compete
with external forces, and with forces that enjoy greater institutional
support. The fact that the Kenyan informal sector and small industries
do not have significant institutional support could only indicate that
external competition should not be full-fledged until institutional
capacity is created. It is only then that competition would be fair for
both local and foreign investors and it is on this that international
financial institutions should focus.
In addition to the above constraints, increase in taxation, basic
commodity prices, interest rates and escalating inflationary trends have
fundamentally lowered the real value of wages or income, thus

35Republic of Kenya, supra note I, at 12, para. 2.13.
3 Jua kali is a Swahili phrase that means "hot sun". When referring to Kenya's informal sector, it
describes the fact that individuals in the sector, who are comprised mainly of metal artisans, work under
very harsh economic and physical conditions. They carry out their trade and craftsmanship in the open
under the hot tropical sun because they cannot afford to rent workshops. See KENNETH KING, JUA KALi

KENYA: CHANGE & DEVELOPMENT IN AN INFORMAL ECONOMY 1970-95 (1996).
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diminishing the significance of the right to work37 and the ability to
strive for and attain an adequate standard of living.
Liberalization of an economy raises the question of just how much
the country should open its borders to foreign investment and
international competition. Legally, the question would be whether the
right to engage in economic or life sustaining activity should be
protected from any and all factors that threaten to extinguish it.
"Privatization and parastatal divestiture plus retrenchment of the civil
service may lead to the control of key sectors of the economy by nonindigenous
interests with the subsequent loss of jobs for local
38
people".
Proponents of the macroeconomic reform process argue that the
market is well able to manage this problem and any interference with
the process is uncalled for. They see that the only impact the state can
have on the economy is to cause distortions in the market which would
impinge on the smooth operation of the market. Powell, advocating
for what he terms "self-determination through unilateral free trade"
says:
The time has come to recognize- that foreign influence is a source
of prosperity because it means people are free to gain the
advantages of ideas, products, capital and talent that may not be
available at home .... The future belongs to countries that take
their destiny in their own hands, open their borders, force their
companies to be more competitive, and make purchasing goods

and services easier and cheaper for millions of working J9eople
who deserve nothing less than complete freedom of choice.

A countervailing argument has been made that many developed
economies today, including what have been termed the East Asia
miracles of South Korea and Taiwan, began with stringent protective
economic policies. 40 It has also been suggested that the role of the
government in a regulated economy is often necessitated by the lack of
37Republic of Kenya. supra note 19, at 12, para. 2.14.

38Kenya, National Development Plan For the Period 1994-96 (1993).
39 J. Powell, Self Determinationthrough Unilateral Free Trade, in PERPETUATING POVERTY: THE

WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds., 1994).
4o Alice H. Amsden, Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to
Dependency Theory, in TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT: A RATIONAL CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 143 (Robert H. Bates ed.. 1994).
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alternative market-based regulatory mechanisms within the developing
countries, which mechanisms are fully developed in industrialized
nations. 4 ' In addition, developing states adopt protective economic
strategies as their only means of survival in the global economic
system, which is itself neither liberalized nor receptive to commodities
manufactured in these developing countries. 42
C. The Right to Participationin Development and Economic Self
Determination
It has been observed that one shortcoming of development
agencies, particularly the international financial institutions, is their
preoccupation with abstractions and total disregard for human beings
for whose benefit, or at whose peril, their work revolves.43 One
manifestation of the denial of popular participation in Kenya's
economic adjustment process is the confinement of the process to
government bureaucrats and the international financial institutions'
economists. Local economists have not been involved and this has
raised concern
about the apparent exaltation of international
"experts". 44 The failure to involve local populations and experts in the
formulation and implementation of structural adjustment programs has
been manifested in unrealistic reform policies. This factor has not
only exacerbated their harsh effects on human conditions but has also
contributed to their limited success.45
The adoption of the Africa Charterfor Popular Participationin
Development and Transformation (ACPPDT)46 followed and
embodied the concerns of the AAF-SAP, 47 most notably, the apparent
imposition of economic policies on the peoples of Africa. The right to
41 Id.
42 See STEVEN D. KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT:

THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST GLOBAL
LIBERALISM (1985).
43 Joseph Gold, Natural Disasters and other Emergencies Beyond Control: Assistance by the IMF,

24 INT'L LAW. 621 (1990), as quoted by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the
Soft Law of the IMF and Human Rights, in II B.U. INT'L. L.J. 81 (1993).
4

IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD:

SELECTED ESSAYS AND

LECTURES 4-15 & 44-68 (1995).
45 G. B. N. Ayittey, Aid for Black Elephants: How Foreign Assistance Failed Africa, in
PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note 39.
46 UN Doc. E/ECA/CM.16/1 I, Arusha, Tanzania, 1990.
47United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. supra note 25.
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popular participation in development 48 counters this imposition in at
least two ways. Firstly, it requires that the people fully and effectively
participate in the determination of decisions that affect their lives at all
levels and at all times. Secondly, it institutionalizes people-based
development founded on their free will to undertake sacrifices, make
49
commitments and expend their social energies for its execution.
The assumption by the international financial institutions of roles
influencing or directing law reform, governance, and economic
policies, has been challenged for fostering undemocratic development.
Notably, the implementation of structural adjustment programs has
been confined to policy-making, as opposed to law-making levels,
based on dialogue with the government bureaucrats as opposed to
engagement with elected representatives. The purpose of this has
been, as much as possible, to avoid entanglement with parliamentary
processes as these are considered time consuming and even impeding.
This, it has been noted, has not been accompanied by the attendant
accountability that should follow any law or policy making
50
discretion.
Two examples may help to illustrate the development problems
that the right to popular participation in development and economic
self-determination seek to address. The first is the economic plunder
and injustice that has accompanied privatization of parastatals. The
on-going privatization of government run entities is, to any keen
observer, reminiscent of the plunder and injustice that was Kenya's
decolonization process. Those holding the reins of political power
amassed large portions of land, as the colonialists departed, leaving
thousands of people landless. 5 1 At the time, little or no serious
48 The ACPPDT was, however, not the first. to make provision for the right to participation
in
development. In 1986, similar guarantees were charted out in the Declaration on the Right to
Development (DRD) UN G.A. Res 41/128, (1986). Article 1(1) states, "The right to development is an
inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." Article 2 further provides, "The human person is the
central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to
development." Indeed, the bedrock of this right seems to be the right of self-determination whose
standard content is the right of all peoples to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development" and to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources".
49 Republic of Kenya, supra note 19, at part I, para. 10.
so Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority:
The World Bank and the
Democratization of Development, 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 159, 187 (1993).
5' This fact is attested to in Himbara, supra note 15; Bates, supra note 17.
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consideration was given to equitable distribution of national resources.
The political dimension of the current privatization process, which is
not appreciated by the present configuration of structural adjustment
programs, is that it lays ground for public institutions to continue to be
owned by the government "privately". Corporations previously
managed by the government are, upon privatization, being acquired by
the same politically connected individuals who run them down.
Popular participation is inhibited, ordinary citizens are unable to
participate in the sales of public enterprises. Moreover the "political"
purchasers of these enterprises do not necessarily assure the efficiency
intended, since they are the very same people who mismanaged the
enterprises in the first place.52
The second problem emanating from the denial of the right to
popular participation in development is the economic alienation of
minority groups whose social, cultural and economic lifestyle has been
less inclined to adopt market liberalism. There are ethnic groups in
Kenya that have historically be marginalized in the development
endeavor and which have been acknowledged by the government to
have "very little linkages to the rest of the economy, facing a
deteriorating natural resource base, declining food security and
deepening poverty".53 To most of these groups, which practice
communal property ownership, capitalism as embodied in privatization
measures is not conducive to their circumstances. No matter how
important market liberalism is to economic growth, it is equally
important to note that it takes time, even assuming its necessity, for
different societies to be assimilated into it. Therefore economic
reform policies must accommodate the right to a different economic
and cultural lifestyle and protect the survival of all in a market
economy.
If these communities have been alienated in the
government-controlled economy, their circumstances could only get
52 T. Mkadawire, The Political Economy of Privatization in Africa, in FROM ADJUSTMENT TO
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, CONTROVERSY, CONVERGENCE, CONSENSUS? 192, 198 (Giovanni
Andrea Comia & Gerald A. Helleiner eds., 1994); JOHN M. COHEN, ETHNICITY, FOREIGN AID, AND

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE CASE OF KENYA 31 (1995), gives an account of this

problem and describes the 1994 sale of Kenya Cashew Nuts limited, a state-owned enterprise, which was
bought for undervalued prices by senior officers and resold at a markup to a Kenyan firm owned by Asian
nationals. This description exposes two forces at play against the right to popular participation in
development, namely, the government forces, which more often than not represent an ethnic force, and the
force of foreign investors.
53Republic of Kenya, supra note 19, at 11.
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worse in an indiscriminately liberalized economy. 54
correctly observes:

Helleiner

If the state is seen as fragile, incompetent or corrupt, as it
frequently is in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is an obvious rationale

for "offloading" many of its responsibilities to the private sector,
however weak it may also be. The problem is that those with the
greater private capacity to respond to market incentives are
frequently foreign firms and/or ethnic minorities. Giving them
'full rein" can create problems of a different kind. Moreover,
particularly in small/or poorly integrated markets, private
monopolies can emerge,
with consequences no less serious than
55
those in public ones.

D. Civil and PoliticalRights
An intimate link exists between civil and political rights and social,
economic and cultural rights. Both categories of rights form the
foundation of the human ideal of freedom, justice and peace. In
enumerating the right to work for example, the ICESCR requires that
remuneration for work be made sufficient as to be consistent with the
need for dignity in living conditions. While the right to work is often
categorized within social, economic and cultural rights, the right to
dignity of the human person is often seen to be within the ambit of
civil and political rights. Nonetheless the failure to ensure social and
economic rights amounts to the violation of the right to human dignity
generally. This linkage is not just in theory. Every day, millions of
54 These are particularly the pastoralists who include the Maasai, Turkana, Samburu and
Karamajong, who, besides failing to be absorbed into the market economy, suffer numerous other
disadvantages by reason of dwelling in arid and semi arid regions of Kenya. Various accounts have been
made on the effects of land privatization on their economic, social and cultural survival. See ELLIOT
FRATKIN, ARIAAL PASTORALISTS OF KENYA: SURVIVING DROUGHT AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA'S
ARID LANDS, (1998); M. M .E. M. RUTrEN, SELLING WEALTH TO BUY POVERTY: THE PROCESS OF THE
INDIVIDUALIZATION OF LANDOWNERSHIP AMONG THE MAASAI PASTROLISTS OF KAJIADO DISTRICT,
1890-1990 (1992).
International law makes provision for the protection of the rights of minorities and indigenous
groups and guarantees the right to self determination. See for example, Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent
Countries (ILO No. 107), adopted June 26 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247; Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, adopted 18 December 18, 1992, G.A.
Res. 47/135, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 911 (1993), 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 54 (1993).
s5From Adjustment to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Consensus and Continuing Conjlict, in
FROM ADJUSTMENT TO DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, supranote 52, at 16.
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people the world over die of starvation, treatable diseases, lack of
shelter, poor sanitation and clean water.
While these grave
circumstances are often attributed to natural catastrophes, many may
be blamed on policy failures.
In recent times, severe deprivation of social and economic rights,
such as death by starvation, has been equated to subjection to inhuman
and degrading treatment. In the case of Francine van Volsen v.
Belgium5 6 the European Commission on Human Rights addressed the
question whether the notion of inhuman and degrading treatment may
be applied to violations of socio-economic rights. In this case, the
complainant brought a claim against Belgium challbnging the
disconnection of electricity supply in her residence, despite her being
in poor health and demonstrating a clear case of inability to make
payments. She alleged that she had been subjected to living in an
unheated, unlit and poorly constructed apartment. The Commission
did not make a complete finding on the issue, as the claim failed on
other grounds. However, it did state that, "in the case at issue, the
cutting off or the threat of cutting off electricity did not reach the level
of humiliation or debasement
needed for there to be inhuman or
57
treatment".
degrading
This decision appears to suggest that it is possible to depart from
the traditional understanding of the concept of inhuman and degrading
treatment to cover socio-economic rights violations provided that a
certain level of debasement is proved. This would have to be
determined on a case by case basis. Although the argument is still
very undeveloped, the European Commission's ruling may have
opened a door that makes it possible to argue that the disadvantageous
effects of structural adjustment programs constitute inhuman and
degrading treatment. Economic policies that lead to death from
starvation or treatable disease, cause suffering, debasement and
humiliation severe enough to amount to inhuman and degrading
treatment may be found to constitute human rights violations.
56 Quoted in Antonio Cassese, Can the Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment be Applied to
Socio-Economnic Conditions?, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 141 (1991). It is there stated that the decision has been
published in 2 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROrS DE LHOMME 384-5 (1990). The claim was brought
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights that states that "no one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".
s Id. at 143.
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It is no longer possible or realistic to attribute blame for human
rights violation to states only, since international financial institutions
are centrally involved and have in fact, through their lending
While the
conditionalities, curtailed states' capacity to act.
not be
should
rights
human
responsibility of the state to safeguard
reduced, present realities demand that we address the question whether
and to what extent international financial institutions should be held
accountable for human rights concerns arising from their policies. This
inquiry does not mean that the past inefficiency of the government in
the economy is to be overlooked, nor that there is no need for macroeconomic reform to address the prevailing economic crisis and make
better human conditions. The call is for the integration of human and
economic development, an appreciation of the complexities and
necessities of postcolonial or late development, and a case specific
approach to policy formulation.
III. Negotiating Between Rigidity and Elasticity within Autonomous
International Financial Institutions
Unlike most other specialized agencies, the international financial
institutions exist and function autonomously from the United Nations.
They have no legal obligation to take mandatory cognizance of
decisions and resolutions of the United Nations. Although the
Relationship Agreements between the United Nations and the
international financial institutions state that the reason for their
establishment is the performance of economic functions within the
meaning of article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations, by virtue of
the nature of their international responsibilities and terms of their
articles of agreement, international financial institutions are treated as
autonomous organizations. 58 The Relationship Agreements go to great
lengths to safeguard the independence of the international financial
institutions by requiring that the United Nations refrain from making
any recommendations to the international financial institutions with
respect to the allocation of loans. 5 9 Such matters are to be left to the
58 Art. I. § 2 of the Agreements Between the United Nations and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, Resolution No. 92 (V) adopted by
the Economic and Social Council, during the fifth session, August 16. 1947, E/558 and E/559/Rev. 2.
"' Id. at Art. IV, § 2.
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financial
independent exercise of judgment of the international
60
agreement.
of
articles
their
with
institutions in accordance
The extent of the independence of international financial
institutions is amplified by the fact that even in matters pertaining to
international peace and security, they are simply exhorted to pay "due
regard" to the decisions of the Security Council. This, depending on
interpretation, does not necessary bind the international financial
institutions to the decisions of the Security Council. Again depending
on interpretation, the obligation does not include "paying due regard"
to the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly. Moreover,
article VI of the Relationship Agreement merely states in extremely
non-committal terms that the international financial institutions should
"take note" of the obligations assumed by member states to carry out
the decisions of the United Nations Security Council.6 '
Such is the magnitude of the independence of the international
financial institutions that, in the context of the objectives of the United
Nations, particularly those governing human rights, it presents a
problem. Even though international financial institutions are the main
international development agencies, their obligation to the ideals
envisioned by the United Nations system as a whole is limited to their
articles of agreement, which have been interpreted rather rigidly,
though with a few exceptions in recent times.
While the World Bank was created to facilitate post second World
War economic reconstruction and development through the promotion
of private • foreign62 investment and long-range balanced growth of
international trade , the International Monetary Fund was to engage in
temporary relief of maladjustment in balances of payments of member
states.63 Several explicit provisions define the boundaries within
60 Id. The only permissible recommendations are those on "technical aspects of reconstruction or
development plans, programs or projects".
6 The section states:

The Bank takes note of the obligation assumed under paragraph 2 of Article 48 of
the United Nations Charter by such of its members as are also Members of the
United Nations to carry out the decisions of the Security Council through their
action in the appropriate specialized agencies of which they are members, and will
in the conduct of its activities have due regard for the decisions of the Security
Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.
62 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as amended
effective February 16, 1989.
6 Articles of Agreement, International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No.
6748, and April 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
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which the performance of these obligations is to be undertaken. The
international financial institutions must base their decisions on what
are termed "economic considerations" and under no circumstances
should they manifest "political" considerations. 64 Article IV section
10 of the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank is explicit in its
prohibition of political activity:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by
the political character of the member or members concerned. Only
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and
these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to
achieve the purposes stated in Article I.
The restriction of the mandates of international institutions to
economic issues is viewed as central to their functions and to their
relationships with other international organizations. Hence, while
section 8 of article 5 of the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank
establishes an obligation on the part of the Bank to cooperate with
other international institutions having responsibilities in the same field,
such cooperation has to conform strictly to the provisions of the
Bank's Articles of Agreement. Any cooperation that implicates any
provisions of Bank's Articles of Agreement may be effected only upon
their amendment.65
What constitutes economic or political considerations has not been
clearly defined and it remains subject to the good judgment of the
international financial institutions. For this reason, the interpretations
have changed over time and they have lacked uniformity in
application. Generally, the Bank has been willing to cautiously
recognize social, economic and cultural rights, without express
definition of the latitude of such protection or of the nature of any
rights accruing as a consequence. Civil and political rights however,
U

Article III §§ 5 (a) & (b) of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement provide:

(a) The Bank shall impose no conditions that the proceeds of a loan shall be spent in
the territories of any particular member or members; (b) The Bank shall make
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes
for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of economy
and efficiency and without regard to political or other non economic influences or
considerations.
65 Articles of Agreement, World Bank, supra note 62.

WHEN THE PENDULUM SWINGS TOO FAR

have been resisted quite strongly. The irony of this is obvious. While
human rights discourse has challenged the justiciability of social,
economic and cultural rights and embraced political and civil rights,
international financial institutions have found it easier to maneuver the
former and not the later. However, when the good governance
framework required the international financial institutions to set
standards for states on civil and political rights, the inadequacy of their
treatment of social, economic and cultural rights emerged.
The original interpretation of the 'economics only' rule was
stringent and narrow. It was based primarily on the notion that
economic issues were unrelated to other disciplines such as politics,
and that they could be kept separate. 66 Law, and more precisely
human rights, was largely considered to be imbued with such
significantly high levels of politics as to be beyond the scope of
economics and hence beyond the mandate of the international financial
institutions. The entire question of the responsibility of international
financial institutions for human rights concerns therefore turns on the
issue of interpretation of the international financial institutions'
mandate, a negotiation between rigidity and elasticity within an
autonomous mandate. The following historical accounts illuminate
this assertion.
Between 1967 and 1968 the United Nations General Assembly
appealed to the World Bank to cease economic, financial and technical
assistance to South Africa and Portugal, which had refused to comply
67
with the decolonization resolutions passed of the General Assembly.
The question whether international financial institutions should
incorporate civil and political rights considerations in their lending
policies, either as economic issues or in cooperation with the aims of
the United Nations, then arose. When Portugal failed to decolonize
territories under its administration, the United Nations General
Assembly then appealed to the World Bank to withhold financial
68
assistance in order to secure compliance.
A similar request was
placed concerning South Africa, which had persisted in apartheid rule,
66
67

EDWARD SAGENDORPH MASON, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETFON WOODS 590 (1973).
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514

(XV), 15 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) U.N. Doc. A/4684, 66 (1960).
U.N. G.A. Res 2184 (XXI) (1966) entitled "Question of Territories under Portuguese
Administration".
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contrary to its obligations under the United Nations Charter and in
defiance of resolutions of the General Assembly and Security
Council.6 9
In rejecting these requests, the World Bank cited Article IV section
10 of its Articles of Agreement which, it claimed, precluded it from
making considerations of non-economic matters in evaluating loan
applications. The World Bank argued that its Articles of Agreement
specifically precluded it from paying regard to the political character
of members or interfering with their political affairs.7 0 In both cases,
the World Bank construed 'economic' very narrowly. Using this
narrow construction, it was unable to identify any economic issue that
would justify action as requested. This was in spite of the fact that
both issues, colonization and apartheid, are replete with evidence of
economic alienation of the affected communities.
The conditionalities attached to structural adjustment lending
policies are evidence of a broadened construction of 'economic
considerations', an attempt to depart from the stringent conception of
development as being confined to economics. The international
financial institutions, particularly the World Bank, now require
measures such as good governance, human rights and democracy to
accompany the macro-economic reform process.
All these
requirements are justified as being necessary for the 'freeing of the
economic growth process', a fundamental mandate of international
financial institutions. 7 1 Thus, although the World Bank prescriptions
on good governance, for example, directly interfere with political
affairs of member States, perception of them as important to economic
development permits their presence in the Bank's development
strategies.7 2 The framework of good governance has been taken to
include the promotion of democracy and observance of the rule of law,
both considered imperative for economic development though perhaps
merely incidental to human rights. Forsythe observes:
69U.N. G.A. Res. 2054 A (XX), 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) of 15' , 20 t hand 21' December, 1965.
70 For a full account of these facts, see UNITED NATIONS JURIDICAL YEARBOOK 108-132 (1967) and
Mason, supra note 66.
71PAUL MOSLEY, AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING (1995). See
also Shihata, supra note 44, at 4-15 & 44-68.
7 For a discussion on the intrusive nature of structural adjustment lending see Jonathan Cahn,
Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159 (1993).
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Under pressure from the United States and others, the Bank has
always been overtly political in a strategic and partisan sense ....

More recently the Bank has been clearly political in taking a very
broad view of what non-economic factors affect economic
performance. Bank practice is highly inconsistent, however; and

there is no Bank theory or programmatic statement capable of
providing meaningful guidelines that could lead to consistent
practice.

The argument put forward in support of this incidental, as opposed

to express, protection of human rights is that though human rights
(both civil and political or economic and social) are undeniably
essential to development, the international financial institutions
should, nevertheless not make such a broad construction of their
Articles of Agreement as to include what is expressly forbidden.74 The
international financial institutions also argue that they do not want to
replicate the functions of other organs of the United Nations, which are
expressly mandated and better equipped to address human rights
violations. The better approach, they suggest, is to strengthen the
ability of these human rights institutions to perform their functions,
instead of advocatin 5a usurpation of their functions by international
financial institutions.
Shihata argues that the role of international financial institutions
involves "transforming the ideals of the United Nations' declarations
and the covenants into realities that can be physically measured in the
member countries". These ideals include freedom from poverty,
education, health and environment.76 If we adopt this construction of
the mandate of international financial institutions, we would conclude
that they are bound by their Articles of Agreement not only to require
democracy, human rights and good governance of developing
countries, but also, on their part, to formulate economic policies,
pursue economic projects or design economic adjustment programs
that are consistent with development, and not adverse to the affected
73 David Paul Forsythe, The United Nations, Human Rights, and Development,
19 HuM. RTS. Q.
334, 347 (1997).
74 Ibrihim F.I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development and InternationalFinancialInstitutions, 8 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. POL'Y 35, 37 (1992).
75id.
6 Shihata, World Bank, supra note 44, at 568.
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peoples' economic, social and cultural rights - notwithstanding the
confines of an 'economics only' rule.
Even though international financial institutions acknowledge, to a
limited extent, that their mandates cover social, economic and cultural
rights (and political and civil rights when these have economic
significance), this does not emanate from a clearly stated legal
obligation. It depends on the breadth of the interpretation accorded
their constitutions, which has changed over time and lacks uniformity
in application. This interpretation has not been encapsulated in the
rights-duties terminology necessary to found legally binding
obligations on the part of international financial institutions.
Consequently, the degree to which these rights will be protected is
uncertain, and will depend on the political will of the international
financial institutions and, to a considerable extent, on that of the
leading western financiers." The promulgation of safety nets under
the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Program and the establishment
of the World Bank Inspection Panel illustrate this and one other point.
The second point is that the economic vision that these institutions
have been peddling has its own limitations, not acknowledged at the
time of designing and initially implementing the macro-economic
reforms. The fact that the earlier, almost fundamentalist, economic
formulations by these institutions have been challenged by the hard
evidence of severe economic dislocation and massive social instability,
has led to a reluctant willingness to rethink their policy prescriptions
and its social implications.
Safety net measures involve the release of funds by the
international financial institutions and other multinational donors
towards the mitigation of the effects of structural adjustment programs
to the 'vulnerable' categories of people in the affected communities.
In addition, the establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel,
though not specifically for the resolution of the effects of structural
adjustment programs, constitutes a fundamental response to important
issues of the right to participation in development and the need to

"See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International Law of the
IMF and Human Rights, I I B.U. INT'L L. 81 (1993), in which he argues that the law of the IMF is
considered to constitute soft rules of international law, meaning that "either failure to observe it or
observing it cannot, by itself, be dispositive of legal effects".
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enhance the accountability and credibility of the World Bank to
peoples of the member states.
A. The Social Dimensions of Adjustment Program
The "Social Dimensions of Adjustment" program in Africa aims at
reducing the negative social consequences of structural adjustment.
Its purpose is to shield the poor from the full impact of the cost of
adjustment. The Bank thus [re-introduced] poverty-alleviation
concerns into its work. This provides some redress for the harm
caused by its own policies.78
In formulating the social safety net programs, the World Bank
hopes to ameliorate the adverse effects of adjustment on the vulnerable
poor populations of reforming countries without deflating the thrust of
economic reform and institutionalization of market economies. The
objective pursued in these programs is negotiation between market led
growth and poverty reduction. 79 The programs are guided by the
realization that, "adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot
be sustainable over the long term unless and until poor and vulnerable
socio-economic groups can fully participate in the emerging economic
opportunities brought about by adjustment",8°
Although the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Program is broad
in its scope, the formulation of social safety nets is premised on the
understanding that only the poorest of the poor need life supporting
protection from the effects of adjustment. Care must therefore be
exercised to ensure no slippage of benefits intended for the poor to the

7

' KATRINA TOMASEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REvIsrrE, 67 (1993). The Social

Dimensions of Adjustment Program was launched in 1987 by the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) Regional Program for Africa, and the African Development Bank with the World Bank as the
executing agency. James F. LEvISON, ADDRESSING MALNUTRITION IN AFRICA: LOW-COST PROGRAM
POSSIBILITIES FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND DONORS (1991)
7 WORLD BANK, THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: A POLICY AGENDA 8
(1990).

80Id. at 23. The following strategies are recommended for social dimensions interventions: (a)
Investing in human capital through nutrition, health, and education programs; (b) Increasing productive
assets to which the poor have access in order to place them on upward income escalators; (c) Raising the
return on these assets through changes in relative prices; (d) Promoting wage employment and reducing
labor market impediments to employment for youth, women, and minorities; (e) Empowering the poor to
expand their economic and social participating through community based projects. Id. at 7.
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non-poor. 8 1 Thus for example, food subsidies, otherwise withdrawn
for other foodstuff, are placed on unrefined maize or grain considered
to be largely consumed by the poor. However, not all essential foods
can be categorized as refined or unrefined, though it is possible to
categorize items as luxurious or not luxurious.
The World Bank admits the importance of strengthening public
expenditure programs benefiting the poor, particularly those for the
delivery of basic services, but insists that not all categories of public
expenditure programs need protection. Protection should be accorded
only when necessary - at the point when the balance tips to cause
adverse effects. To intervene before this point, the World Bank
argues, would lead to inefficiency and regression. 82 In the same breath
however, the World Bank also encourages investments from which
social returns are the highest such as education and basic health care.
The World Bank has also set up social safety net measures to
mitigate the plight of retrenched public sector workers in the reform
process. The Kenya government had in the late eighties set up early
retirement programs under which employees who retired voluntarily
were given a 'golden handshake' - a money package intended to serve
as an incentive for early retirement and to help the retiring worker to
enter the private sector. The World Bank now views such schemes,
including strict retirement age regulations, as inefficient. Instead, the
World Bank favors the retrenchment of young workers who, in any
event it argues, may not be as valuable to the public sector as the older
experienced employees. Voluntary retirements are now also not
encouraged because they risk the exodus of the most qualified
personnel. Since the young workers are presumed to be more
politically vocal, severance packages are given to them to ease their
acceptance of redundancy. Enhancement of severance packages
through the imputation of value to other allowances such as housing
and medical insurance is also encouraged, particularly in
83
circumstances where the ratio of salary levels to allowances is low.
In some instances, retraining of workers declared redundant has been

81WORLD BANK, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: REFORMS, RESULTS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD (1993).

2 id.

83WORLD BANK, FINANCING ADJUSTMENT WITH GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1986-1990, at

21(1986).
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recommended despite the fact that thousands of already trained
workers and professionals remain unemployed.
The mechanism of social safety nets has several shortcomings, the
most fundamental of which is that it often has not gone beyond mere
rhetoric. Since the international financial institutions have their minds
set on the adjustment, no matter the social cost, the best that has been
done is to formulate, not necessarily implement, social safety nets.
Thus, even in the face of widespread human suffering, the World Bank
has relentlessly stated that the road ahead for adjustment in Africa is
clear:
Continue with the macro-economic reforms, complete the trade
and agricultural sector reforms, restructure public finances, and
provide an environment conducive
to private production and
84

provision of goods and services.

The social safety nets approach has been described, for good
reason, as a fig leaf, designed by the World Bank to deflect criticism
while basically continuing with the same approach. 85 The approach
offers temporary relief while assuming, questionably, that structural
adjustment prograrhs when fully implemented, will bring permanent
solutions to the difficult issues ensuing from privatization of
government enterprises, trade liberalization, deregulation, and
rationalization of government expenditure. These issues include
inequality, massive unemployment, food shortages, disease, illiteracy,
and loss of land and property.
Implementing the social safety nets requires government funds.
This points to a contradiction: the creation of social safety nets calls
for further external aid and assistance. Why should government
expenditure on basic services be cut down, only for the government to
take loans to establish social safety nets? Moreover, external aid is
scarce and often an inadequate resource to create sufficient social
safety net programs. The inadequacy may be attributed to the fact that
the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programs are not formulated as
part of the structural adjustment programs, but as external solutions to
g4 WORLD BANK, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 81, at 219.

85Barati Sadasivam, The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: A Governance and Human
Rights Agenda 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 630, 646 (1997).
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mop up after them, and therefore do not form an important aspect of
the structural adjustment budget. Consequently, unless structural
adjustment programs, and indeed all other subsequent economic
policies, are specifically redefined and formulated to include human
rights concerns, it will be difficult to guarantee protection of these
rights.8 6 The resources needed to cater for the cost of adjustment must
be ascertained beforehand, and their cost must be worked into the
design of economic policies.
The problems that caused the debt crisis, such as mismanagement
of development aid, have not been addressed in any direct or
substantial way. Thus, even though financial assistance may be
created for the formulation of 'safety nets', there is no guarantee that
the funds will be utilized for the benefit of the so-called vulnerable
groups. It is imperative that economic reform is defined to take into
account the social and political context which, in the case of Kenya,
may be characterized by lack of accountability on the part of
government officials to ensure the benefits of the social safety nets
reach those for whom they are intended. The importance of popular
involvement in governance and economic development projects
becomes in these circumstances indispensable.
If human development is to be achieved as part of economic
growth, a strong public sector mechanism for the provision of basic
utilities, such as a working infrastructure and life sustaining
imperatives such as health, education, agricultural support services,
sanitation, clean water shelter and a healthy environment, are
indispensable. By providing social safety nets in the place of a longterm investment, the international financial institutions are weakening
the foundation upon which human development and economic growth
depends. This constitutes an inverted conception of the needs of a
developing nation. s7
The formulation of social safety nets was based on the assumption
that the need to address the adverse effects of structural adjustment
programs would be temporary. Sooner rather than later, the results of
macroeconomic reform would be manifested in economic growth and
86Id. at 645: "Given the reality of long term social deterioration and poverty consequences of SAPS,
there is now increasing concern with the need to integrate social variables into policy analysis at the time
the loans are negotiated."
87 id.
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improved standards of living. It has, however, become abundantly
clear that the change in the economic circumstances of the reforming
States will take a longer period of time to achieve. Social Dimensions
of Adjustment Program should therefore have more long term, if not
permanent, solutions to the adverse effects of structural adjustment
programs than currently contained in the social safety nets.
B. The World Bank Inspection Panel
The World Bank Inspection Panel was established in response to
demands for greater accountability, transparency and disclosure to the
public of information regarding the operations of the Bank. 8 It was
created at a time of increased discontent with the Bank's operations.
This discontent was expressed by United Nations, member states and
non-governmental organizations, with some states threatening to
withhold part of their assessed contributions to the United Nations
unless an independent inspector general's office was set up to monitor
the activities of the Bank. The sense of discontent particularly arose
over the environmental and social impact of projects funded by the
Bank, some of which had resulted in mass displacement of
communities and severe environmental degradation.89
Most
exceptionally, the United States made an amendment to the
International Financial Institutions Act requiring that beginning
December 1991, its executive director at the World Bank would
refrain from voting in favor of any action that would have a significant
effect on the human environment unless an environmental impact
assessment had been made available to the Bank, affected groups and
local non-governmental organizations "at least 120 days before the
date of the vote". 90 The Bank sought, through its own internal

88The Panel was established by a resolution of the board of executive directors, IBRD Resolution
No.93-10, and the identical IDA Resolution No.93-6. For a concise summary of the history and
operations of the Panel, see 1BRHIN I.F. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 2-3 (1994).
s' Among the many accounts made on this discontent are: PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE
LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991), and BRUCE RICH,
MORTGAGING THE EARTH: THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF
DEVELOPMENT (1994).
90The amendment was effected through the United States 1989 International Development and
Finance Act. See Shihata,lnspection Panel, supra note 88, at 28.
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mechanisms to respond positively to these charges of operating
without accountability and transparency. 91
The inspection panel faces several limitations. First, the panel
does not entertain individual complaints. Its mandate only permits it
to examine the Bank's compliance with its own procedures. 92 The
rationale for excluding individual complaints is that allowing them
would lead to frequent, frivolous and baseless claims. In any event, it
is argued, since the Bank funds projects, it is unlikely that these would
affect only one person. Hence, only groups or representative(s) of
groups in the territory of the borrower state are eligible to request the
inspection procedure. They must show that their rights or interests
have been or are likely to be directly, materially and adversely affected
by the acts or omissions of the Bank. Inspection can not therefore be
requested unless it is shown that the Bank, and not any other party, has
failed to follow its operational policies and procedures in carrying out
a project. 93 Inspection may be requested if the Bank fails to follow up
the implementation of a project once it has begun funding it.
Inspection cannot, however, be requested if the project has been
completed. A project is considered complete when 95% of the loan
has been disbursed to the member state or recipient body. The
inspection panel is not a judicial, but merely an investigative entity,
and it does not, therefore, make any decisions. Its mandate is limited
to reporting its findinfs
to the board of executive directors of the Bank
9
for necessary action.
An important question for our purposes is whether claims of
violations of human rights through the implementation of structural
adjustment programs may be brought before the inspection panel.
Most of the inspections that have been carried out by the panel so far
have involved investment projects. However in 1996, a group of
citizens in Bangladesh, who were shareholders/chief executive officers
of private sector jute mills, made a request for inspection with regard
9' Id. at 36. The Panel's stated objective is:
To provide independent judgment that could help resolve major differences in cases
where it is asserted that rights and interests of parties are adversely affected because
the bank has failed to follow its operating policies and procedures in the design.
appraisal and or implementation of bank lending operations.

'2 1d. at 93.

9 Id. at 96.
4
9 1d. at 98.
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to the Jute Sector Adjustment Credit, of which they were to be
beneficiaries as the sector privatized. Their complaint was that a
three-year delay in the implementation of the credit had put several of
their mills out of business and threatened others. This complaint, the
eighth to be handled by the panel, and the first on adjustment credit,
affirmed that the panel had jurisdiction over such projects. The panel
did not recommend an inspection into the complaint because the Credit
was about to close, a fact 95that was considered to render purposeless
any such recommendation.
The important thing to consider about the possibility of invoking
the inspection function on matters pertaining to structural adjustment
programs is that, first and foremost, the onus of proof lies with the
complainants to show that the Bank has failed to act in accordance
with its policies in the implementation of its projects. While it would
be difficult to challenge the policies guiding structural adjustment
under this procedure, it seems possible and practicable to challenge the
implementation and effects of specific projects under structural
adjustment measures. A hypothetical case may be land privatization
policies that have the potential of leading to mass eviction of
communities, or to disinheritance of groups holding communal or
indigenous land rights.
The strong involvement of institutions, particularly international
financial institutions, suggests that the formulation of laws, policies
and regulations that affect individuals and groups, their livelihood and
economic well being is no longer the preserve of sovereign states, and
neither is the responsibility and accountability arising as a
consequence.
While the sovereignty of states continues to be
negotiated and curtailed ostensibly to secure international peace,
prosperity and security, the autonomy of international financial
institutions continues to be treated as sacrosanct. This autonomy can
only be defended, if at all, in circumstances where the mandate of
international financial institutions is narrower, rendering them
incapable of streamrolling macroeconomic reforms with heavy human
rights implications. This notwithstanding, the heavier weight still rests
on states to absorb the shock wrought on human rights conditions by
95Richard E. Bissell, Current Developments: Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World
Bank, 91 AM. J. INT'L L 741, 743 (1997).
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the invidious economic reforms imposed by international financial
institutions.
IV. Conclusion: A Call to Negotiate Between Efficiency and Justice
Democracy is rarely so obliging as to stop at national borders. The
gathering forces of participation are likely to affect all institutions
of global governance. They may lead to more democratic

decision-making in the World Bank and the IMF and to a
strengthened socio-economic role for the UN system. The new
demands are for the security of people, not just for the security of
nation-states. 96
Scholars have made three arguments or proposals for promoting
the synthesization of human rights with the law of international
financial institutions. The first is the amendment of their Articles of
Agreement to bridge the gap between the so-called 'political and
economic considerations' and to resolve the well exploited
interpretation ambiguity. The Articles of Agreement of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which expressly accord an
open political mandate and require observance of ideals of democracy,
pluralism and market economics as preconditions for financial
assistance, serve as a showcase for the possible cohabitation of politics
and economics in international finance issues. 97
However the
procedure of writing human rights into the constitutions of
international financial institutions would still be 98incomplete if they
failed to be inward as opposed to outward looking.
A second option, and by far the more favored, is the broad
interpretation of the Articles of Agreement so as to recognize human
rights as part of the economic responsibility of the international
"6MAHBUB UL HAQ, supra note I, at 37; David Paul Forsythe, supra note 73, at 334.
9 Moiler, The World Bank: Human Rights, Democracyand Governance, 15 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 28
(1997). This call has been countered by the argument that the European Bank was created under a
different set of circumstances than the World Bank and the political mandate it enjoys is specific to the
prevailing conditions at its creation which do not obtain for the latter. These special circumstances are
inter alia that the European Bank was established to assist in the formation of market economies in
Central and East Europe and that its focus is on a more homogenous group of states than the World bank.
For a comparative analysis of the constituent agreement, see IBRAHIM I. F. SHIHATA, THE EUROPEAN
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUENT

AGREEMENT (1990).
"This argument is well made by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, supra note 77.
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financial institutions. The broad interpretation option has found
greater favor among scholars because it has been considered very
unlikely or difficult to secure the successful amendment of Articles of
Agreement which requires a three fifths support of member states. 99
The weaknesses of the interpretation option have already been
discussed. This is because, mainly, interpretation over time has not
been consistent and it cannot be relied upon for the protection of
human rights. It has been correctly observed that international
financial institutions have an aversion to human rights terminology,
particularly those construed as 'political', and prefer instead
expressions such as 'social assessment',1 °° However, even the
developments leading to the broader interpretation of the Articles of
Agreement of international financial institutions have scarcely been as
a result of the international financial institutions own independent will.
Many concerted forces have come into play to influence the elasticity
of the interpretation and it is possible that, with increased participation
of ordinary people in development, this influence could be carried
forward to meaningful fruition without the amendment option being
chosen. 101
The third argument is that if human rights norms are understood as
jus cogens, international financial institutions are legally obliged to
comply, notwithstanding provisions of their constitutions or the
possible narrow interpretation that may be accorded them. 10 2

Jus

cogens refers to international law norms that are thought to be so
fundamental that they invalidate international law rules drawn from
treaty or custom. 10 3 Such a peremptory norm presupposes an
international public order sufficiently potent to control states (and
other non-state actors) that might otherwise establish contrary rules.'°4
99 Articles

of Agreement, World Bank, supra note 62.

'00David Paul Forsythe, supra note 73, 334.

101Moller, supra note 97, discusses the difficulties that would attend the amendment option for the
purpose of requiring that international financial institutions get influenced by human rights in their lending
policies and attempts a formulation of a "weak test" that would be more practical and plausible.
102M.

Bedjaoui, The Right to Development and Jus Cogens, 2 LESOTHO L. J. 93 (1986); Shihata,

International Financial Institutions, supra note 74, at 35. (Discusses this argument and while
acknowledging the supremacy of peremptory norms of international law over the laws governing
institutions, states that the decision not to make political or human rights considerations in the functions of
international financial institutions does not in any way abridge human rights and would in fact serve to
protect them).
103

MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODucTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 62 (1999).

104Id.
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A jus cogens norm, therefore, is one that "prescribe[s] a certain
positive or negative behavior unconditionally... [one that] cannot be
derogated from"10 5 , a norm "accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character". 1°6 The danger of following this path lies in the difficulty
that human rights in general have encountered in seeking recognition
as norms of jus cogens. Recognized norms of jus cogens, namely
those capable of 'pricking the conscience' of humanity, are generally
in the order of crimes against humanity such as genocide. This
provides too strict and10 narrow
a standard to be helpful in the context of
7
institutions.
financial
Human rights, whether read or written into the mandate of
international financial institutions, require a supervisory, advisory or
adjudicative enforcement mechanism. An attempt at this is probably
the inspection mandate of the World Bank Inspection Panel. However,
the Panel is not a judicial body and does not have authority to pass
judgment, make declarations or issue directives in response to
complaints lodged with it. It is merely an investigative body.' s It
therefore does not satisfy the search for an institution endowed with
enforcement mechanisms, able to obtain specific responses from the
World Bank. It has been argued that it would be inappropriate to
subject the activities of financial institutions to judicial process as
these not only enjoy judicial immunity but have also adopted
arbitration as the mode of dispute resolution. Furthermore, it is
argued, this weakness is mitigated by the fact that the findings and
recommendations of the Panel, together with the decisions of the
109
Executive Directors on such findings, are liable to be made public.
While this is probably plausible, the World Bank Inspection Panel,
constituted and structured to work within the legal framework of the
Bank, can hardly answer to what in ordinary legal parlance is
103
Verdoss, Forbidden Treaties in International Law,

31 AM. J. INT'L L 571-72 (1937).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63
AM. J. INT'L L 875 (1969).
107
See Hilary Charlesworth, The Gender of Jus Cogens, in 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 1, 63-76 (1993).
'08
Shihata, Inspection Panel, supra note 88, at 98.
109Id.
106
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considered an arbitration organ. Its affiliation makes it vulnerable to
the "conflicts of interest inherent in the Bank's multiple roles as a
development agency, lending institution, debt collector, and
representative of developed countries interests". 10
In addition, the Bank's mandate is limited to the evaluation of the
implementation of Bank policy and does not include the determination
of the standing of Bank policy or of the interpretation of Bank mandate
as against public international law. Moreover, the fact that a
complaint can only be filed for an alleged failure of the Bank to follow
its own rules and procedures during the design or appraisal or
implementation of a Bank-financed project, is a serious limitation on
the mandate of the Inspection Panel for two substantive reasons. First,
the Panel can only accept cases that relate to problems in the design or
This means that the
construction of Bank-funded operations.
Inspection Panel is limited only to examining those shortcomings in
the implementation of Bank projects according to its (the Bank's) own
criteria - rather than the general international obligations embodied,
for example, by human rights and environmental standards.
Consequently, the Panel can only examine the Bank's compliance with
its own operational guidelines.
Second, since the Bank has not adopted a human rights policy
within these guidelines, human rights concerns appear to be outside
the Panel's mandate. Additionally, the Bank's operational guidelines
specify certain criteria such as financial, institutional, technical,
sociological, and environmental considerations, which may or may not
provide some opportunity to accommodate human rights concerns.
This is without mentioning that the Panel's mandate is limited to the
World Bank and International Development Association, which
excludes the International Monetary Fund and other international
financial institutions that may have a mandate affecting human
rights. ' An independent international enforcement agency would
therefore be more useful for the purpose of adjudicating the human
rights obligations of international financial institutions.
Cahn, in his analysis of the law-making role of the World Bank
and the need to ensure accountability, recommends the formation of a
110
Mason, supra note 66, 190.
1' Shihata, Inspection Panel, supra note 88, at 39.
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"watchdog agency to address the problems raised". He proposes that
the agency should have the capacity to "monitor, report on, and
intervene in the World Bank lending process". He designs a watchdog
agency that would report to both the taxpayers in developed countries,
who underwrite much of the development program, and citizens of
developing countries, who bear the heavier burden of failed efforts.
The agency would also have consultative mechanisms with
participation by the supposed beneficiaries of national adjustment
programs and development projects, and an enforcement mechanism
projects and programs with
empowering it to intervene in and reassess
2
them."
restructuring
of
possibility
the
Comparing this proposition with the mandate of the World Bank
Inspection Panel, there is no shadow of doubt that an independent
body, endowed with sufficient enforcement mechanisms, would be
better placed to monitor the human rights obligations of the
international financial institutions. Yet, the age-old enforcement
problem prevalent in international law would undoubtedly haunt this
process as well. Nonetheless, the formulation of a watchdog agency
would have the advantage of drawing from past experience, and the
specific successes that have been achieved in addressing this problem
to date.
Because reliance on international enforcement mechanisms is
likely, at best, to result in haphazard and inadequate responses to the
human rights violations that result from the economic policies of
international financial institutions, measures that provide better
protection for human rights at the domestic level are imperative. I
believe that it is essential that the Constitution of Kenya protects social
and economic rights. There are two important advantages in taking
this course. First, the wasteful state and individual plunder that have
drained the economy, aggravated the debt crisis and created huge
disparities between the rich and the poor, would no longer go
unquestioned under the law. Even while admitting that laws have a
greater propensity to serve the interests of the privileged before or
instead of those of the less privileged" 3 , laws once spelt out can have a
Jonathan Cahn, supra note 50.
,13D. Trubek, & M. Galanter, Scholars in Self Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law
112

and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 .Wis. L. Rev. 1062.
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life of their own and have the potential to out-do powerful interests to
embrace justice. Second, too often economists and lawyers tend to
speak conflicting languages:
Economists have been reluctant to commit themselves to this type
of thinking: for them justice is a notion that defies scientific
analysis and also there is the problem of setting up a social welfare
function which is inconsistent with the efficiency assumptions
which as we have seen, are central to their thinking.' 4
The law and economics school attempts to inform law making with
neoclassical economics sense.'15 The analysis made here would
suggest a less instrumental use of law and an approach that answers to
the exigencies of the circumstances and brings economics and law
together to yield economic justice. Legal provisions for social and
economic rights would be the product of this intercourse.
In thinking about the challenges of treading the path of economic
justice, I find Anthony Marx's Making Race and Nation116 and
117
Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship
quite instructive, though of course they could be read in many different
ways. Both describe the set of circumstances and the nature of
interests that have conglomerated to change the course of history. The
intensity of the South African anti-apartheid movement, like the
resilience leading to the 'myth of racial democracy' in Brazil, were
programmed by the level of formally institutionalized injustice and
oppression.
Moore traces the rise of communism to peasant
revolution, clearly defining the dangers of economic oppression of one
group by another. The rise of democratic societies in England and
America is attributed to the rise of a powerful working class and that
of fascism to the pervasive reign of the ruling class.
While both these authors present historical accounts of
considerable periods, macroeconomic reform programs present to us
DENNIS LLOYD BARON, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 376 (51" ed. 1985).
n1 See Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics fron a Critical Legal Studies Approach in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 465 (Peter K Newman ed., 1998); Kerry Rittich,
Recharacterizing Restructuring (1998) (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard Law School).
114

'16
ANTHONY MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION, A COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED
STATES AND BRAZIL (1998).
117 BARRINGTON MOORE, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY:
LORD AND
PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (1966).
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immediate problems. If history is to be of importance to us in dealing
with these problems, it is to indicate that the negotiation between state
and market, efficiency and justice, private and public is inevitable. It
is from this premise that I would consider the incorporation of
economic, social and cultural rights in the South African constitution a
major achievement and would recommend the same for the Kenyan
constitutional reform process. Hard line opposition, such as that taken
by Sunstein, should be negotiated:
Some positive rights establish government interference with free

markets as a constitutional obligation. For countries that are trying
to create market economies, this is perverse. A constitution that
prevents the operation of free labor markets may defeat current
aspirations in Eastern Europe.. .With constitutional rights, as with
much else, less may be more. A constitution that purports to
guarantee a decent society may, in the process, guarantee nothing
at all.'' 8

After confronting the economics-justice stand off we find that we
are beset by the legal challenge that social, economic and cultural
rights are non-justiciable.i1 9 The challenge of non-justiciablity implies
that writing these rights into the constitution would adversely affect
the importance and significance of the promises of a constitutional
document that a government must fulfill to its citizens. In addition, the
respect owed to the courts would be eroded if they were required to
adjudicate over rights that they would not enforce. The difficulty of
enforcing economic, social and cultural rights as against the state
emanates from the possible lack of sufficient or any resources to
provide these rights. Moreover, even though it might be possible to
prove that the State has sufficient resources to provide these rights to
those deprived of them, it has been considered improper for the

11Carl Sunstein, Against Positive Rights: Why Social and Economic Rights don't Belong in the New
Constitution of Post-Communist Europe. 2 E. EUR. 'CONST. REv. 35 (1993). It is even arguable whether
this stance reflects the United States position in view of the two famous cases of NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.. 301 U.S. I (1937) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) upholding as
constitutional the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938 respectively.
SlySteiner, supra note 33, at 298-306. See also Sunstein, id.
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judiciary to interfere with government
budgetary allocations, this
20
being the province of the legislature.'
The claim of non-justiciability of economic, social and cultural
rights refuses to acknowledge that within market economies,
governments collect taxes to provide public goods and perform
welfare functions as a matter of their responsibility. Making written
provisions on these rights would only be a short list of the range of
functions that governments should perform. The quest for economic,
social and cultural rights therefore transcends political ideology. It
refuses attempts to be attributed to socialism and communism. Also, if
the test of justiciability is whether governments can be confronted with
negative rights requiring them to desist from doing one thing or
another, then political and civil rights cannot pass the test. The list of
political and civil rights that governments both in the North and South
continue to flout is endless.
Practice has challenged theory on difficulties of the justiciability
argument. The Indian Constitution has been interpreted by the
judiciary to include economic and social rights in its provision for the
right to life. 12' The South African Constitution has made express
provisions requiring the government to take up the challenge of
steering toward economic, social and cultural guarantees that were, for
a long time, suppressed under the apartheid regime. 122 Institutional
support for constitutional democracy has been created with a specific
mandate to ensure the realization of social, economic and cultural
rights. In addition, regional human rights institutions, such as the
European Commission on Human Rights have adjudicated individual
23
claims
social
This has
been done even
though of
the economic
concerned and
States
have rights.'
a liberal market
or mixed
economy.

'2 The South African Constitutional Court faced this limitation in the SoobramoneyCase, infra note
122, in which it decided a claim for the right not to be denied emergency medical treatment, guaranteed
under the South African Constitution.
'2' See Steiner, supra note 33, at 306.
122 In a number of key provisions, the South African Constitution guarantees social and economic
rights. Most notably Section 26 guarantees the right to adequate housing while Section 27 makes
provision for the right of access to health care services, including reproductive health care, sufficient food
and water, social security and social assistance. The South African Constitutional Court has, further,
given generous interpretations to these provisions. See, for example, the celebrated case of Thagraj
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa Zulu-Natal) Case CCT 32/97, (unreported) where the Court
affirmed the right to emergency medical treatment in circumstances of scarce resources.
123 Casese, supra note 56.

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99

This essay has been an attempt to negotiate between the two
polarized economic policy prescriptions in mainstream development
scholarship. The first is that held by the Post-independent State in
Kenya as in most other developing countries before 1970, which is one
of heavy government presence in the marketplace to regulate the pace
and direction of investment, trade and growth. With time, this led to
egregious inefficiency, demoralized civil service and stunted growth
caused by lack of political space and lack of incentives to invest.
Since this economic vision was marked by severe protectionism to
cushion national industries from competition and was informed by
import substitution philosophy often funded by loans from multilateral
agencies and foreign governments, it led to crushing debt burdens on
the developing countries. This ushered in the second economic
prescription: That of the international financial institutions especially
in the post-1970 period. This is marked by an excessive prejudice
against State participation in the development process and an almost
dogmatic bias in favor of foreign creditors, 'free' trade and foreign
investment no matter the consequences. This vision dictates that
whenever there is an economic problem, the government is the cause and the market is the solution. The structural adjustment programs
imposed by the international financial institutions on the developing
countries to 'rescue' their economies, therefore, is in the form of a
uniform prescription: cut government spending on health and
education, raise taxes and liberalize the rules for foreign investment
and trade. The result has been that while the developing countries
urgently need to increase spending on health care, education and
sanitation, structural adjustment programs have forced such countries
to reduce such spending. I have here impugned the propriety of
international financial institutions to manage and direct the economic
policies of developing countries in light of the human rights
obligations of States to their citizenry. This is in view of the fact that
the international financial institutions have often literally dictated
economic policies whose effects have been to grossly violate the
human rights of the citizens of developing countries. In the ultimate, I
suggest that there is an urgent need to re-evaluate the efficacy of
structural adjustment programs in view of the human costs that they
have exacted. While I urged that international financial institutions

WHEN THE PENDULUM SWINGS TOO FAR

should be obligated by one of three formulations to incorporate human
rights in their economic prescriptions to developing countries as a way
of giving structural adjustment programs a 'human face', I expressed
general skepticism that this is likely to occur soon. In any event, most
of those whose rights are most adversely affected by the structural
adjustment programs are the weak sectors in the society: The poor,
women, children and pastoralists who are the "perennial losers in the
political struggle"' 24 and who do not have sufficient political influence
to lobby the international financial institutions through their
governments. I therefore end with a proposal that would, in effect,
compel the State to take human rights including social and economic
rights seriously - and which might involve not only the curbing of the
mindless plunder of public resources currently taking place and
encouraged by a corrupt and rent-seeking ubiquitous State, but also
encourage a re-negotiation and/or rejection of structural adjustment
programs with the international financial institutions. This is the
writing of the economic and social rights in to the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution - by no means an entirely radical step - but still a
significant step in the right direction.

12 LAWRENCE TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1454 ( 2 ed. 1988).

